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What the United States Taught the
Commonwealth About Pure
Economic Loss: Time to Repay the
Favor
Bruce Feldthusen*
This paper deals with a discussion of the comparative treatment of the
recovery of pure economic loss in negligence, a topic that has dominated my
scholarship for more than thirty years.' My purpose is more to discuss how
my research in this area has been informed by comparative study than to
articulate the relevant rules and principles themselves. Some of the points of
substance I will make will be contentious, and I will leave those debates to
other publications and other times. I hope this makes today's topic more
interesting.
Many American tort lawyers would not recognize "economic loss" as an
organizing principle for tort law; or if they did, they might not restrict the
topic to negligence law. In what I will loosely call the CommonwealthEngland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand-most lawyers would
understand this subset of negligence law to include cases of the following
types:2
1. Negligent misrepresentation brought, for example, where a nonprivity third party sues for losses suffered from investments made in reliance
on negligently prepared corporate financial statements.
2. Negligent performance of professional services where perhaps a
frustrated beneficiary sues the solicitor who negligently drafted an impugned
will.,
3. Relational economic loss brought by a plaintiff who suffers

Dean and Professor, University of Ottawa Faculty of Law.
1. See generally BRUCE FELDTHUSEN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE (Thomson, 5th ed. 2008)
(chronicling the common law principles which govern the recovery of pure economic loss since its
first edition published in 1984).
2. Winnipeg Condo. Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Constr. Co., [1995]I S.C.R. 85, 96-97 (Can.).
3. This is actually a more robust category in the United States. If one ignores the controversial
line of authority allowing frustrated beneficiaries to recover from negligent will drafting solicitors,
there is little Commonwealth authority of this type. This category is not discussed below.
*
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economic loss because of some relationship enjoyed, usually contractual,
with a victim of physical damage. For example, a business suffers when a
railway bridge on which it depends is damaged by a negligently operated
ship.
4. Suits brought to recover the cost of repairing or replacing a defective
product or structure under a theory of negligence rather than in contract or
statutory sales law.
5. Claims brought against statutory public authorities for the negligent
exercise of or failure to exercise statutory powers or duties. For example, a
claim brought against a municipality for failing to detect latent defects in
housing construction during municipal inspections. 4
My work in this area and the presentation today depends on two basic
ideas. While there are certain similarities between any one of these five
types and one or more of the others, it is the differences between them that
are most significant. Essentially, there exist five different variations of the
negligence action within the category we call "economic loss." This is wellappreciated in the United States but less so in the Commonwealth.
Despite these significant differences, each of the five pure economic
loss claims is substantially distinct from claims for physical harm, whether
personal injury or property damage. This makes the category of "pure
economic loss" a meaningful and important category of negligence law,
distinct from standard accident law.
My story begins in 1976, the year I graduated from law school in
Canada. This was also the year that I began my graduate studies in law at
the University of Michigan. The standard line, as we hear it in Canada, is
that no one needs a graduate degree to obtain a teaching position at a good
law school in the United States. A J.D. from any one of the top ten law
schools in the United States, possibly coupled with a good clerkship or a few
years government service, will suffice. LL.M.s are for foreigners and
Americans from lesser schools needing to upgrade their credentials.
4. The core issue in these cases is usually the breadth of immunity for discretionary decisions of
a statutory public authority (expressed in both proximity and immunity language), and little, at least
in theory, turns on the economic nature of the loss. See, e.g., Kamloop v. Neilson, [1984] 2 S.C.R.
2, 2-3 (Can.) (discussing the duty of care owed by city inspectors to "persons whose relationship
was sufficiently close that they ought to have been reasonably within its [the city's] contemplation as
likely to be injured by a breach of duty"). In the Commonwealth, the leading defective structure
cases have often involved suits against negligent municipal building inspectors, where the
negligence in the first instance was economic loss caused by the builder. See, e.g., Anns v. Merton
London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728, 733 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (where the plaintiff
claimed that the Merton London Borough Council filed to ensure the proper construction of
foundations either by failing to make an inspection at all or by overlooking the foundation problems
during inspection); Murphy v. Brentwood Dist. Council, [1991] 1 A.C. 398 (H.L.) (damages claimed
by plaintiffs were alleged to be the result of the municipality approving plans for a house with a
defective foundation); Kamloops, 2 S.C.R. at 2 (also addressing the liability of building inspector).
The arguments for a duty of care for both plaintiffs tended to be merged, although there is in fact no
reason why, for example, the municipality might owe a duty but the builder might not. This
category is not discussed below.
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Moreover, the idea of doing graduate work in law in another country is
seldom entertained by American law graduates.
Canadians don't quite fit that model. If one wants a teaching position in
a Canadian law school, an LL.M is almost required. Increasingly, one
requires a doctorate. In 1976, this effectively meant a prospective Canadian
law professor needed a graduate degree from either England or the United
States. Graduate education was little developed in Canada. Traditionally,
the preferred route had been England, more or less for colonial certification,
similar to the reasons why small state law school graduates might go to an
Ivy League school in the United States. But the clever Americans were
making inroads with generous scholarships-that was a big factor in my
going to Michigan. A few Canadians, and Allen Linden was one of the first,
had the foresight to see that the United States was the stage on which the
greatest changes in law and legal education of the twentieth century would
take place.
Many of us knew one more thing about graduate legal education in a
foreign country, whether that be England, the United States, or elsewhere.
We believed there was inherent value in learning how a different country
with a different political and legal history and culture dealt with the same
issues we were dealing with in Canada. We knew that difference was
instructive-not necessarily better, but always instructive.
The study of difference is still highly valued in Canadian law schools. I
learned many lessons in difference at Michigan, most more profound and
interesting than my topic today. In contrast, Americans have often been
content with their excellent domestic systems-difference has not seduced
them. In my opinion, that is a shame. I commend you for inviting so many
foreigners to participate in this conference today.
Back to pure economic loss-essentially a financial loss that is not
causally connected to personal injury or property damage suffered by the
same plaintiff.5 This was, or at least I thought it was, the hottest topic in
Canadian tort law in 1976. Imagine my disappointment when I arrived in
Michigan. I had been admitted, funded, and supplied with a panel of three
advisors based on my proposal to study "pure economic loss." The first
thing I discovered is that none of my advisors had a clue what I was
proposing to study. None of them had ever heard of "pure economic loss,"
let alone as an organizing principle of negligence law.6 Perhaps many of
you feel the same way today. Let me try to explain why that might be so and
5. Robert J. Rhee, A Production Theory of Pure Economic Loss, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 49, 49
(2010).
6. My adviser was Professor Luke K. Cooperrider, assisted by Professors Marcus Plant and
Donald Cohen.
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then to explain why I learned more about this topic than I ever would have
dreamed by studying U.S. economic loss law at Michigan.
Pure economic loss became the hot Canadian tort topic that I thought it
was largely as a result of a famous 1963 decision of the English House of
Lords in a case called Hedley Byrne v. Heller.' There, for the first time in
the British Commonwealth, a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation
leading to pure financial loss was recognized. It was here that pure
economic loss as an organizing category was born. Thirteen years later my
Canadian professors, or at least those who had heard of the decision, were
still stumbling around trying to make sense of it. The pace of legal change,
and for better or worse the pace and volume of case law digestion, has
changed a great deal since 1976. Back then it took a few decades for Hedley
Byrne to become recognized for what it eventually was, second only to
Donoghue v. Stevenson,5 the most influential torts decision ever in the
British Commonwealth. 9
How, you may wonder, does an English decision figure so prominently
in a story about a Canadian going to graduate school in the United States?
At the time I attended law school in Canada, English decisions were treated
as if they were decisions of the Canadian courts. Not de jure, but de facto.
Nowhere more than in the legal system had Canada remained a colony of
Mother England more than 100 years after formal independence. Indeed,
several of my professors and many judges treated English decisions as if
they were superior to those of the Canadian courts.'o Our law schools were
populated by professors who were trained in English law, if not English
nationals themselves. These same professors would warn us against even
referring to decisions from the United States. Allan Linden was truly a
pioneer. This all seems so foolish today.
The law of negligent misrepresentation as established in Hedley Byrne
has been enormously influential to both tort and contract law in the
Commonwealth, including Canada. But the decision had a much broader
impact than just within the confines of misrepresentation itself. In 1967, the
great Patrick Atiyah published an article in England in which he observed
that "[u]ntil . .. Hedley Byrne .. . it was reasonably clear that the general

rule was that liability in the tort of negligence did not extend to purely
economic loss.""
Atiyah went on to question whether Hedley Byrne had effectively
overturned a general rule precluding recovery for pure economic loss in
7. [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.).
8. [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.).
9. As identified in Anns, which itself is a decision of great importance in British tort law. See
Anns, [1978] A.C. at 751-52.
10. See Bruce Feldthusen, City of Kamloops v. Nielsen: A Comment on the Supreme Court 's
Modest Clarification ofColonial Tort Law, 30 McGILL L.J. 539, 556-58 (1985).
11. P.S. Atiyah, Negligence and Economic Loss, 83 LAW .Q. REv. 248, 248 (1967).
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negligence that had existed for centuries.12
In fact, there never had been any such general rule.13 For the most part,
few had ever tried to recover economic loss in negligence. They turned to
contract instead.14 There was then, and is today, a clearly-established
exclusionary rule for what we call relational economic loss-economic loss
suffered because of some financial relationship, usually contractual, that
exists between the plaintiff and the victim of physical damage.' 5 For
example, if a tortfeasor negligently severs an electricity line belonging to a
utility company, a plaintiff may not recover for financial losses suffered
while it is deqrived of power. The same exclusionary rule exists in the
United States. 6 It is usually described as the rule that precludes recovery
for negligent interference with contractual relations.' 7 I am sure Patrick
Atiyah was well aware of this, and well aware that Hedley Byrne had little or
nothing to do with the exclusionary rule for relational loss. a Nevertheless,
his article was seminal in developing the recognition of pure economic loss
as an organizing category of Commonwealth negligence law.
Of course, that was my problem back in Ann Arbor in 1976. In the
United States, pure economic loss had not yet been recognized as an
organizing category of negligence law. Indeed, many American tort lawyers
would still not recognize it as such today. My supervisors simply did not
recognize the term. It would take more discussion to determine that they
were quite familiar with precisely the types of cases I wished to study.
I began by directing their attention to Hedley Byrne. They had never
heard of the case, but of course my supervisors were familiar with the law of
Perhaps the
misrepresentation, including negligent misrepresentation.
easiest way to identify that body of case law to this audience is by reference
to section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.19

Interestingly, the

action in negligence for misrepresentation was coming into its own in the
12. Id.at256-61.
13. See id. at 265-69 (explaining that when one considers case law regarding claims for
pecuniary loss brought in tort, the results are capricious).
14. See FELDTHUSEN, supranote 1, at 27.
15. See Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A Descriptive
Theory, 73 TENN. L. REV. 177, 193 (2006).
16. A firm exclusionary rule precluding almost all recovery for relational economic loss has
existed in the United States since the mid-nineteenth century. See Anthony v. Slaid, 52 Mass. 290
(1846).
17. See Peter Benson, The Problem with Pure Economic Loss, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 823, 824 n.2
(2009).
18. The argument that it had overturned the exclusionary rule for relational loss was made and
rejected a year earlier in Weller & Co. v. Foot & Mouth Disease Research Inst., [1966] 1 Q.B. 569
(Eng.).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 552

(1977).
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United States at about the same time it was recognized in Hedley Byrne.
There were subtle differences, however, that would prove significant. One
might describe the action in the United States as negligent
misrepresentation,negligence being but one manner of finding liability for
misrepresentation.20 In contrast, the Commonwealth's approach was better
described as negligent misrepresentation, an expansion of the parameters of
the basic personal injury negligence action. The significance of the
difference between negligence in word and deed, although prominent in
Hedley Byrne itself, has attracted relatively little attention in the
Commonwealth. Instead, what came to be regarded as significant about the
misrepresentation action in the Commonwealth was that it extended liability
in negligence to a heretofore unrecognized category of actionable damagepure economic loss. 2 1

I probed further by asking my supervisors if they were familiar with the
exclusionary rule for relational loss. They did recognize the rule that
precludes recovery for negligent interference with contractual relations,
although they would not have described it as a prominent part of mainstream
tort law. This rule dates back until at least 1846 in the United States 22 and
1875 in England 2 3 and is applied almost without exception in those two
countries to preclude recovery for economic loss consequential upon
physical damage to a third party.24 Not coincidentally, as I shall explain
below, this exclusionary rule is not recognized in Australia 25 and is subject
to several exceptions in Canada.26 In the United States, this is usually
described as the rule that precludes recovery for negligent interference with
contractual relations, the term "economic loss" figuring little if at all until
much later. 27

Kindly wishing to ease my discomfort, Professor Marcus Plant then
intervened to assure me that he was familiar with an emerging term,
"economic loss," in quite another context-the product liability field. This
is a somewhat different type of pure economic loss that refers to a claim to
recover the cost of repairing or replacing a product or structure that suffers

20. The others being deceit and strict liability for breach of warranty.
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22. See Anthony v. Slaid, 52 Mass. 290 (1846).
23. See Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., [1875] 10 L.R.Q.B. 453, 457; Simpson & Co. v.
Thompson, [1877] 3 App. Cas. 279, 289-290 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.).
24. See FELDTHUSEN, supra note I at 207, for a more detailed discussion of when exceptions to
this generally strict rule are applied.
25. See Perre vApandPly Ltd. (1999) 198 CLR 180, 193, 219.
26. See Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. St. John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210,
para. 46 (Can.).
27. The leading authority is Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927),
superseded by statute, Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 202, 87 Stat.
584 (1973) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1651 (2009)).
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from an internal manufacturing or construction defect. 28 The general,
although not universal, rule in the United States is that such claims are
governed exclusively by statutory sales law and precluded in tort, whether
the action is brought in negligence, strict tort, or tortious warranty. 29 The
rule in England is now essentially the same. 30 Again, Australia3 ' and
Canada 32 have more liberal rules of recovery.
At this point in the developing effort to solve the mystery of pure
economic loss in the United States, one of my supervisors asked the question
that I should have asked myself, at least after reading the Atiyah article.33
He asked whether my thesis could possibly be that there existed some useful
relationship between the study of the exclusionary rule for relational loss and
the exclusionary rule in the product liability context. Piling on, as a group of
law professors can do when dealing with a poor graduate student, another
supervisor was more blunt, asking: What on earth did the law of negligent
misrepresentation have to do with either exclusionary rule? How, for
example, would a study of an accountant's possible liability to a corporate
investor who had relied on negligently prepared corporate accounts
enlighten one about whether a restaurant on an island could recover its
business losses from a ship that had damaged the only bridge that allowed
customers to access the island?
As a Canadian of that era, the answer was obvious to me-these cases
all involved claims for pure economic loss. Patrick Atiyah suggested they
should be grouped together. 34 It was equally obvious to me that this
28. Economic loss in product liability is defined as financial loss which is not a consequence of
physical damage to the plaintiff's person or property. FELDTHUSEN, supra note 1, at 174 n.24.
29. American courts have long precluded recovery in such a claim, and this rule gained traction
when the United States Supreme Court approved of it in the maritime case East River Steamship
Corp. v. TransamericanDelaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
30. This rule came into focus in England after Murphy v. BrentwoodDist. Council, [1991] 1 A.C.
398 (H.L.). Indeed, prior to the issue being raised in Murphy, there were few Commonwealth cases
that discussed recovery for cost of repairing or replacing the defective product or structure itself.
See FELDTHUSEN, supranote 1, at 181-83 (discussing the relevant case law and the development of
this rule).
31. The court in Woolcock St. Invs. Pty v CTG Pty Ltd. (2004) 216 CLR 515, seemed to adopt the
same result as the prevailing English or American position except with a methodology that suggested
it was not establishing a precedent, but rather rendering a fact-specific decision. Australian courts
also permit a homeowner to sue for defects to residential premises, or more accurately, one court has
permitted a particularhomeowner to sue in a particular case. See Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR
609.
32. See Winnipeg Condo. Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Constr. Co., [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85, 97 (Can.) (going
at least as far as to allow recovery in negligence for dangerous defects-a rule also recognized in a
few American states).
33. Atiyah, supranote 11.
34. See id. at 275-76.
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explanation was not going to convince a single member of my graduate
panel, at least not without a great deal more work, and so ended my dreams
of a year of Wolverine games and rock concerts at Cobo Hall. It was back to
the library.
You will be relieved to know that I do not plan to reveal below the
details of the law governing these and other types of pure economic loss
cases across the English speaking world. I hope you will buy my book
instead. I do, however, have some observations, questions, and tentative
conclusions to share with you.
The first question is: Why did the Commonwealth courts and writers
adopt pure economic loss in negligence as an organizing category? What
made them think (even if, as in the case of Atiyah, it was a thought they
raised and then immediately rejected) that relational loss jurisprudence could
be enlightened by misrepresentation law and vice versa? In contrast, why
did the Americans, as exemplified by my graduate committee, find the
grouping of these different lines of authority to be incoherent?
It is tempting to attribute credit (or is it blame?) to Atiyah and perhaps
to counsel in Weller35 who seem to have been the first to employ this
approach, even if their attempt was soundly rejected. Perhaps it was the
catalytic power of the decision in Hedley Byrne36 which blew up the dam of
doctrinal rigidity in Commonwealth private law? Perhaps it was the
lingering formalism of the previous century-if two cases both had the
words "economic loss" in their holdings, they had to be meaningfully linked.
These were the days when the instrumentalism that dominates American tort
law was almost entirely foreign to Commonwealth law. To be frank, I really
have no idea why the law developed as it did in the Commonwealth.
The American position is easier to understand. In my opinion, there is
virtually no useful cross-fertilization between the law of negligent
misrepresentation and the rule that precludes recovery for relational loss or
the law that precludes recovery for damage to a product or structure itself.
The law of negligent misrepresentation has much to draw upon from the
general law of misrepresentation and from the law of contract. It is typically
a commercial tort. The product liability rule is based on respect for
contractual allocations of risk primarily in commercial law. Finally, the law
of relational economic loss is about drawing bright lines to limit the
otherwise indeterminate consequences of ordinary, physical-damage
negligence law. My supervisors' intuition that I was misguided in thinking
that they were meaningfully related to one another was correct.
35. [1966] 1 Q.B. 569 (Eng.).
36. [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.).

37. Obviously, there comes a higher level of abstraction where similarities exist-there are legal
wrongs in the private law sphere; there are insurance considerations; there are deterrence
considerations; there are risk allocation considerations; et cetera. By the time it comes to
considering litigating of such a claim, or allocating the risk in advance of such a claim, my view is
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The next question is: Did the generalizing approach to pure economic
loss produce any significant differences between law in the United States on
the one hand and law in the Commonwealth on the other? I think it has
made a tremendous difference. For more than twenty-five years after
Hedley Byrne was decided in Canada, and perhaps until this day in
Australia, courts have rambled meaninglessly from one line of authority to
another to absolutely no useful end. Two hundred years of relational loss
jurisprudence produced a firm exclusionary rule that everyone in commerce
recognized and adapted to without difficulty. Muttering Hedley Byrne like a
magic chant, Commonwealth lawyers and judges abandoned the
exclusionary rule or replaced it with unpredictable, unprincipled ad hoc
decisions.3 8
The chaos was impossible to contain, and it next spread to defective
product/structure law. If there ever was a case for applying contract law
over tort law, it would be to deal with questions of whether plaintiffs got
what they bargained for from the person with whom they bargained. Tort
law has a limited role, if any, to play in this area. Nevertheless, potential
negligence39 liability for non-accident caused damages, such as the cost of
repairing or replacing defective products or structures, began to develop in
the Commonwealth at about the same time that Atiyah published his article.
Again, these came forward as "economic loss" cases, and neither
misrepresentation law nor relational loss law had anything useful to
contribute to this debate. Nevertheless, the spirit of Hedley Byrne, and the
general right to recover economic loss in negligence that it supposedly had
created, managed to destroy well-established and well-founded principles of
contract law as applied in the defective product and structure areas.40
that these similarities pale in comparison to the functional benefits of concentrating more on the
differences within the categories.
38. There are many Canadian examples, which finally culminated in the decision in Canadian
Nat'I Ry. v Norsk Pac. S.S. Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 (Can.). It was not until 1997, in Bow Valley
Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. St. John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210 (Can.), that the Supreme
Court of Canada eventually reestablished (almost) the exclusionary rule for relational loss, which it
ought not to have abandoned in the first place. The best example of ad hoc decision-making and the
resulting chaos, in my opinion, is the Australian decision in Perre v ApandPty Ltd. (1999) 198 CLR
180. See also Bruce Feldthusen, Pure Economic Loss in the High Court of Australia: Reinventing
the Square Wheel?, 8 TORT L. REV. 33, 52 (2000) (explaining that in Perrev Apand, the High Court
of Australia "encourage[ed] an expensive and uncertain case-by-case approach to economic loss
generally and to relational loss particularly").
39. In the United States, the debate involved not only negligence, but also strict tort and tortious
warranty.
40. By coincidence, a number of the leading decisions involved suits against municipal
authorities for negligent inspection or failure to inspect defective structures. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text. As noted previously, the courts erroneously assumed that the scope of the
public authority's liability had to be identical to that of the remote builder's. See supra note 4 and
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It took years for first England 4 ' and then Canada 42 to correct this jumble
and to return, for the most part, to sensibly recognizing misrepresentation,
relational loss, and defective product liability as three quite distinct areas of
study, as had always been the case in the United States.4 3 Australia would
eventually determine that builders were not liable to non-privity parties for
defective structures." However, the High Court still groups all economic
loss claims together and tends to resolve them with high level abstractions
such as "vulnerability" on a case by case basis. 4 5 This leads to an overinvestment of judicial and litigation resources in what ought to be a simple
question of commercial law. It destroys certainty. Why?
If you accept what I have said so far, the final question is whether I have
simply proven to you that American lawyers are right when they decline to
do graduate work in the Commonwealth. Not so fast. It turns out that the
distinction between economic loss and physical damage is indeed
significant, and it also turns out that the time may just be right for tort
lawyers in the United States to start paying attention to that fundamental
distinction.
Pure economic loss is meaningfully different from personal injury and
property damage. Financial loss is morally different from personal injury
and death. A human being is not a thing. It is no coincidence that both law
and philosophy recognize rights in person and property but only economic
interests. Many pure economic losses consist of transfers of wealth, not
social losses. Moreover, many pure economic losses can be and have been
allocated by contract in circumstances where private ordering is clearly
superior to tort liability. Economic loss claims often, although not always,
raise the potential for indeterminate liability.
Most of these variables apply, albeit with different emphasis, to each of
the types of economic loss I have been discussing: misrepresentation,
relational loss, and product/structure defect loss. Seldom, or with little

accompanying text. This development led to the idea that public authorities might also be liable for
a much broader range of liability for economic loss than had previously been permitted. See, e.g.,
Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728, 751-54 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.); Kamloops v Neilson, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, 2-3 (Can.). Eventually England would foreclose
such liability entirely in Murphy. In Canada, the illusion still exists that one may recover economic
loss for the negligent exercise of statutory discretion, although actual decisions to that effect are
virtually non-existent.
41. It was not until the 1991 decision in Murphy that some order returned.
42. See Winnipeg Condo. Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Constr. Co., [1995] I S.C.R. 85, 96-97, 105-06
(Can.) (specifically endorsing the five categories of pure economic loss identified earlier, but
adopting the unsupportable position that a builder is liable to a remote purchaser for dangerous
defects).
43. Opinions differ, but in support of this being a good thing, I would point to the relative
stability that has prevailed in all three of these areas of economic loss law in Canada since the
Supreme Court decided to require the plaintiffs to categorize rather than co-mingle their claims.
44. See Woolcock St. Invs. Pty v CTG Pty Ltd. (2004) 216 CLR 515, 515.
45. Id. at 530-33.
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impact, do they apply to personal injury or property damage. Taken
together, these factors demonstrate that there is little to be gained in trying to
approach pure economic loss negligence cases with the basic rules of
physical damage negligence law based on foreseeable harm to a foreseeable
plaintiff.
It is true that the fundamental distinction between pure economic loss on
the one hand and physical damage on the other is most important in
jurisdictions where there is no settled jurisprudence and where the different
categories of economic loss are jumbled. As noted above, there is ample
evidence from Canada and Australia that when the courts do not grasp these
fundamental distinctions, the chances are good that ad hoc decision making
will replace reasoned analysis.46 In contrast, respecting the distinction
between economic loss and physical damage has proven important in the
United States.47 The distinction is implicit in the old U.S. interference with
contract cases and the misrepresentation authorities. It is explicit and has
been most significant in the newer U.S. product liability cases. Indeed, the
U.S. product liability cases are among the most impressive of all judicial
decisions in explaining the distinctions between economic loss and physical
damage. 48
Now for a surprise ending. Not too long ago the American Law
Institute launched an ambitious project to produce the Restatement Third,
Economic Torts andRelated Wrongs. This project was far broader than, but

included, the topics covered in this article. The Reporter for the project was
Professor Mark Gergen, someone I had never met before the project began.
It turned out that he and I shared many of the same views about economic
negligence law, and he was kind enough to refer to my work as he
formulated his analysis and drafts.
In December 2007, despite having produced a tremendous amount of
superb background material and drafts, Professor Gergen resigned as the
Reporter for the project. In his letter of resignation sent to the Advisers,
Consultants, and Council Members, Professor Gergen said:
At the meeting I presented Council Draft No. 2 covering much of
the field of economic negligence. There was strong disagreement
46. See supranotes 38-45 and accompanying text.
47. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 147 (1965); see also Sarah Borstel Porter,
Economic Loss in Product Liability: Strict Liability or Unform Commercial Code? Spring Motors
Distributing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 28 B.C. L. REV. 383, 390-91 (1987) (explaining the important
distinction drawn by the California Supreme Court in Seely between recovery for personal injury and
economic loss). Since Seely, most U.S. jurisdictions have accepted this distinction as central. See
FELDTHUSEN, supranote 1, at 190.
48. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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voiced at the meeting about the direction taken in the draft. The
draft states the law of economic negligence (and in particular
negligent misrepresentation)in terms that emphasize its relation to
contract law and that distinguish the law of economic negligence
from accident law involving physical harm. The criticism was that
the law of economic negligence should be situated within a general

tort of negligence.... On these and many other points, stating
negligent misrepresentation and economic negligence more
generally to emphasize the relation of these bodies of law to
contract law illuminates the law and avoids confusion and
unnecessary error. 4 9
Professor Gergen resigned over a fundamental disagreement as to
whether the distinction between economic loss and physical damage was
justified, and whether the close relationship between economic loss cases
and contract law, in which Professor Gergen believed, actually existed.
Having attended some of the American Law Institute meetings, I can tell you
that those who saw economic negligence as a wrinkle on the general law of
physical damage negligence law believed equally that it is productive to
group all negligence cases together and to resolve them with reference to
high level principles rather than relatively clear rules that apply in easily
identified categories of cases. Of course I believe this is a totally misguided
approach.
The irony is that the United States today finds itself facing the very
questions with which I began my graduate work in 1976. Is it useful to
distinguish meaningfully between economic loss and physical damage? Is it
useful to distinguish clearly among different types of economic negligence
claims? Whether one sides with Gergen and me, or against us, American
tort lawyers and scholars should find the Commonwealth experience with
these questions very interesting indeed.

49. Letter from Mark P. Gergen, Fondren Chair of Faculty Excellence, University of Texas
School of Law to Advisers, Consultants, and Council Members, American Law Institute (Dec. 2007)
(on file with the author) (emphasis added).
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